SANCTIONS MECHANISMS IN WORLD PRACTICE
Abstract
This article analyzes fundamental motivation and mechanisms of economic and other sanctions, as re-strictions for trade and capital flows, asset freezing, arms embargo, restrictions for technology access etc. Motivation for sanctions is wide enough: containment of countries with aggressive policies, observance of human rights, formation of public opinion in favour of foreign policy goals. As recently, there is a shift away from various foreign trade re-strictions, including embargo on exports and imports of goods and services, and towards financial and travel re-strictions, as well as towards secondary sanctions aimed at third countries. Success of sanctions is determined by such factors as effectiveness of secondary sanctions, support by diplomatic pressure, interest for private companies. Insuffi-cient effectiveness of economic sanctions can be expected in several cases, such as opportunities for import substitution, availability of strategic natural resources (energy carriers, metals, gold, diamonds), support of third countries. It is not ruled out that these third countries gain most from sanctions. Consequently, determinacy of senders in supporting of a prolonged sanction regime should account for secondary sanctions in the first place. International experience of sanc-tions is rather ambiguous. The least successful have been sanctions aimed at political regime change, resolving of terri-torial disputes and fighting terrorism. For example, international sanctions have not prevented North Korea from de-velopment of nuclear arms and have not stopped similar program of Iran. Even a relative success of sanctions against South Africa is not always associated with sanctions, being explained by more important factors such as ongoing inef-fectiveness of economic system or changes in the international arena. In some cases sanctions can be a response to the logic of domestic and foreign politics, with no intentions to exert a substantial economic pressure on target countries. It is not uncommon that sanctions are of the so-called cosmetic flavour, being referred to as «television» or «fake» ones.
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