CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY AS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL ORDER IN THE NORMATIVE LEGAL DOCTRINE

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of the constitution as a fundamental principle of the legal order in the positivist legal tradition. The authors substantiate that the constitution is not just a normative category it is a natural result of the deployment of the attribute of hierarchy in legal reality. Based on a study of the normative teachings of G. Kelzen it is concluded that legal reality requires vertical connections so that legal prescriptions can be at least in the minds of binding nature. The hierarchy of law cannot presuppose the infinity of subordination of one norm to another it requires discreteness, completeness. The authors explain that in the state-legal existence a specific dimension of the basic norm is the Constitution, but thanks to H. Kelzen's substantiation the real value of such a legal phenomenon becomes clear. The Constitution becomes the basis for the existence of other norms the starting point formal and mental. The authors explain the special position of the constitution in the legal consciousness of man through the study of Kelzen's doctrine of the fundamental norm, because even without being significantly immersed in its content, it still appeals to it as something basic. The authors argue that the variability of social relations requires flexibility in creating new rules and changing old ones, but in order for the legal system not to fall into continuous relativism there is a need for a stable factor that sets the vector of legal meanings in social reality. This factor is the constitution. The article argues that the constitution always has an ontological basis, which is concentrated in certain results of human existence in particular in custom as the primary regulator of social relations. Depending on the center of legal content (morality, religion, communication, consciousness, etc.), the constitutional form is filled.